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HOLLAND V. ILLINOIS: THE SUPREME COURT
NARROWS THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION AGAINST
DISCRIMINATORY JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to trial by jury is a valued part of the American democratic
tradition.' The jury protects the individual against government oppression2
while affording citizens the opportunity to participate in the administration
of justice.3 Discrimination in the selection of jurors undermines both the
unique function of the jury in the protection of individual liberty4 and the
opportunity that the jury provides for participation in the justice system. 5
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. Illinois6 narrows
the scope of protection against discrimination in the jury selection process
by removing any Sixth Amendment basis for challenging the improper
exercise of peremptory challenges. 7 By precluding any Sixth Amendment
1. See J. VAN DYKE, JuRY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OuR UNCERTAIN COMMrrmENT TO
REPREsENTATIVE PANES 1 (1977) (describing jury as most democratic of institutions). Van
Dyke notes that the idea that ordinary citizens without experience in judicial decision-making
should be assembled to decide issues of great importance is unusual in the world today. Id.
Allowing citizens instead of judicial experts to render judicial decisions ensures that the
judgment rendered reflects common sense and gives the decision a "stamp of democratic
legitimacy." Id. at 219.
2. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text (discussing protective function of jury
in common law history of development of jury); infra notes 86-119 and accompanying text
(discussing case law recognizing protective function of jury).
3. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (quoting Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (stating that sharing in
administration of justice through jury service is phase of civic responsibility).
4. See Note, Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HA.v. L.
Ray. 1472, 1559-60 (1988) (stating that discrimination in jury selection procedures undermines
fact-finding ability of jury, contributes to unconscious racism, and influences outcome of jury
deliberation); infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text (arguing that discriminatory jury
selection procedures undermine common sense judgment of jury which serves to protect
defendant from government oppression).
5. See Note, supra note 4, at 1560-61 (stating that underrepresentation of minorities on
juries resulting from discriminatory jury selection procedures deprives minority citizens of basic
democratic right to participate in administration of justice); cf. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (stating
that restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments of
community is inconsistent with constitutional concept of jury trial).
6. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
7. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's holding
that Sixth Amendment does not prohibit discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges);
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challenge, the Holland decision effectively limits analysis of charges of
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to the test formulated in Batson
v. Kentucky.8 Under Batson, if a defendant shows that the prosecution used
peremptory challenges to excuse potential jurors of the defendant's race
solely on the basis of race, then the defendant establishes a violation of the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. 9
The limited applicability of the Batson test, however, restricts effective
protection against the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 10
II. DEsciPnoiN OF JURY COMPOSrIION PROCEDURES
Although jury selection procedures vary greatly among jurisdictions,"
the process generally consists of three stages.' 2 The first stage is the com-
pilation of the jury wheel, which is the list of persons who are qualified
statutorily to serve as jurors. 3 The second stage is the selection of the
venire, or panel, from the pool of eligible jurors through the exercise of
disqualifications, excuses and exemptions of potential jurors. 4 The third
infra note 20 and accompanying text (defining peremptory challenge and describing acceptable
basis for exercise).
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
8. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (describing Batson
test for proving discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); infra notes 40, 158 and
accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's default to Batson equal protection analysis for
resolution of claims of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
9. See infra notes 41-59 (discussing Batson and equal protection analysis of claims of
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: " [N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Co~sT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See infra notes 159-236 and accompanying text (arguing that standing requirement,
narrower scope of protected cognizable groups, and state action requirement cause Batson
equal protection analysis to afford less protection against discriminatory jury selection proce-
dures than Sixth Amendment fair cross-section analysis).
11. See J. VAN DYrE, supra note 1, at 258-62 (summarizing state jury selection proce-
dures); Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures after Taylor v. Louisiana,
43 TENN. L. REv. 1, 7 n.24 (1975) (listing state statutory provisions governing jury selection
procedures); Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1988) (specifying
federal jury selection procedures).
12. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 85-175 (dividing jury selection procedures into
composition of jury wheel, composition of venire through grant of excuses, and composition
of jury through exercise of challenges).
13. See id. at 85-109 (describing composition of jury wheel). According to Van Dyke,
drawing names at random from lists of registered voters is the usual procedure for compiling
the list of jurors that composes the jury wheel. Id. at 85-86. Federal courts and most state
courts employ this random selection process. Id. Some state jurisdictions, however, allow court
clerks or jury commissioners to consult "key men" within the community to solicit names of
qualified jurors. Id. at 86-88.
14. See id. at 111-37 (describing selection of venire from jury wheel through disqualifi-
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stage is the selection of the jury from the venire through voir dire and
exercise of statutory challenges.' 5
For years, much of the litigation concerning discrimination in the jury
selection process focused on the first two stages, the compilation of the
jury wheel and the selection of the venire. 16 In recent years, however,
litigation concerning discriminatory jury selection procedures increasingly
has focused on the selection of the jury through the exercise of statutory
challenges. 7 The statutory challenges exercised in the final stage of jury
selection are of two kinds: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. 8
Challenges for cause are available in unlimited numbers to either side upon
a showing of actual or implied bias of the juror. 19 A limited number of
cations, excuses and exemptions). The venire is the panel of potential jurors from which the
jury for a specific trial is drawn. See Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation
of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1717 (1977) (describing venire). A potential
juror may be disqualified from the venire if the juror does not meet age, residency or literacy
qualifications, or if the juror has a mental or physical infirmity or a felony indictment or
conviction. See J. VAN DYi.E, supra note 1, at 131-33 (describing disqualification process). A
potential juror may be excused from the venire upon a showing that jury service would impose
undue economic hardship, that the juror is a woman, aged or young, that the juror would
have to travel too far to serve, or that the juror is ill. Id. at 119-26. Finally, certain persons
are exempted from jury service on account of occupation. Id. at 130-31. For example, elected
officials, clergy, doctors, police officers, and lawyers may not serve as jurors. Id.
15. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 139-75 (describing selection of jury from venire
through voir dire and exercise of challenges). Van Dyke explains that voir dire, literally "to
speak the truth," is the process of questioning and challenging prospective jurors for bias. Id.
at 139-40. Generally, the court or counsel tells the prospective juror something about the case
and the parties and questions the juror to determine whether the juror is biased. See Saltzburg
& Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Represen-
tation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 339 & n.13 (1982) (describing voir dire process); Note, supra
note 14, at 1717 (same).
16. See Note, The Civil Implications of Batson v. Kentucky and State v. Gilmore: A
Further Look at Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 891, 895
(1988) (noting litigation aimed at eliminating discrimination in preparation of jury list and
selection of venire); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986) (listing cases concerning
discriminatory jury selection procedures).
17. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 805 (1990) (considering whether
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all black jurors from white defendant's
jury violates defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury); Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986) (considering whether removal for cause of prospective jurors
because of views on death penalty violates defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn
from cross-section of community); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely on basis of
race violates defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection).
18. See J. VAN DYK, supra note 1, at 139-40 (describing challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges); Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doc-
trine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501, 519-20 (1986) (same); Saltzburg & Powers,
supra note 15, at 33942 (same).
19. See J. VAN DY ER, supra note 1, at 140 (describing challenge for cause); Massaro,
supra note 18, at 519-20 (same); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 15, at 340 (same). Saltzburg
and Powers suggest that actual bias involves a finding by the court that a potential juror is
prejudiced with respect to the particular defendant. Id. These commentators note that the
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peremptory challenges are available to either side, and counsel may exercise
peremptory challenges without stating a reason. 20 Because counsel need give
no reason, the exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse potential jurors
provides an opportunity for discrimination.
2
1
III. SUMMARY OF Holland and Batson
The United States Supreme Court has often considered claims of dis-
criminatory jury selection procedures. In Holland v. Illinois, 22 the Court
considered whether a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to
remove all black potential jurors from a white defendant's jury violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury23 The
white defendant, Holland, alleged that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to remove the two black venire members of the thirty potential
jurors assembled for trial. 24 Holland argued that this allegedly discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution denied Holland a fair
possibility of a jury representing a cross-section of the community, a right
secured by the Sixth Amendment.Y
The Court first distinguished Holland's Sixth Amendment claim from
a claim based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26
court implies bias if the juror is related to any of the parties to the litigation or if the juror
has other special interests in the outcome of the trial or the participants. Id. Van Dyke notes
that although challenges for cause are unlimited in number, the actual number of jurors
excused upon a challenge for cause in a particular trial is usually very small. See J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 1, at 140 (stating that court usually excuses only one to three jurors for
cause in typical trial).
20. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 139-40 (describing peremptory challenge); Massaro,
supra note 18, at 520 (same); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 15, at 340-42 (same). Saltzburg
and Powers note that although no reason need be given for the exercise of peremptory
challenges, individual litigants traditionally have used such challenges to remove jurors perceived
to be biased against the party's interests. Id. at 341-42. These commentators note that because
each side uses peremptory challenges to remove biased jurors, the resulting jury is free from
extremes of bias and satisfies the impartial jury requirement imposed by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 342; see also Note, supra note 14, at 1718-19 (arguing that purpose of peremptory
challenge is to remove juror with specific bias toward individual case).
21. See Note, supra note 16, at 895-96 (noting that peremptory challenge allows counsel
to remove prospective jurors solely on basis of race because challenge can be exercised without
explanation).
22. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
23. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 805 (1990). The Holland Court first considered
the preliminary issue of whether Holland, a white defendant, had standing to assert a Sixth
Amendment challenge to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to remove black
potential jurors from Holland's jury. Id. Citing previous cases holding that every defendant
may object to a venire that is unrepresentative of a cross-section of the community, the Court
held that a defendant need not be a member of the group of jurors excluded from service to
raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the composition of the jury. Id. at 805-06.
24. Id. at 805.
25. Id. at 806; see infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (discussing development
and purpose of Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement).
26. Id. at 806-07.
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The Court noted that the equal protection clause prohibits discrimination
in jury selection at both the venire and the jury stages. 27 In contrast, the
Court noted that the Sixth Amendment implicitly requires representation of
a fair cross-section of the community on the venire.2 The Court stated,
however, that the fair cross-section requirement does not preclude a litigant
from diminishing the representativeness of the jury through the exercise of
peremptory challenges. 29 Indeed, the Court concluded that peremptory chal-
lenges enable each party to eliminate prospective jurors perceived to be
biased against the party's interests and, therefore, preserve the impartiality
of the jury.30
According to the Holland Court, the goal of jury impartiality is the
central purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.31 Thus, the
Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement
assures an impartial but not a representative jury. 32 The Court reasoned
that if the goal of the Sixth Amendment was representation of a fair cross-
section of the community on the jury, then the exercise of peremptory
challenges to exclude any identifiable group from the jury would be imper-
missible.33 The Court further reasoned that a rule extending the fair cross-
section requirement to the jury would undermine recognized bases for
exercising peremptory challenges 34 and ultimately would require the total
27. Id. The Holland Court reasoned that the Fourteenth hAmendment's "intransigent
prohibition" of racial discrimination, and not an inseparable link between the venire and the
jury stages, justifies the preclusion of race-based exclusion of potential jurors at the jury, as
well as the venire, stage. Id. at 807; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing
venire and jury stages of jury selection).
28. Id. at 807.
29. Id. The Holland Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section re-
quirement prevents the State from "stack[ing] the deck" in the State's favor, but that the
State may use peremptory challenges "once a fair hand is dealt" to eliminate potential jurors
belonging to groups which the State believes would unduly favor the other side. Id.
30. Id. at 809. The Holland Court reasoned that a party's perceptions of bias may rest
on grounds of race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of prospective jurors. Id.
at 807 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965)).
31. Id. at 809. The Holland Court concluded that jury impartiality is the central purpose
of the Sixth Amendment by reasoning that the peremptory challenge was a "venerable"
tradition at the time of Blackstone. Id. at 808. The Court further noted that early legislation
and case law support the inference that the peremptory challenge was part of the common
law background of the Sixth Amendment. Id. & n.1. Finally, the Court noted that the states
have used peremptory challenges during the two centuries since the Constitution. Id. Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment phrase "impartial jury" must take
its content from this common law and case law tradition. Id.
32. Id. at 807.
33. Id. at 809.
34. Id. at 810. Although the Holland Court did not define recognized bases for the
exercise of peremptory challenges, the Court clearly contemplated factors such as race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliation. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (listing
acceptable bases for exercise of peremptory challenges according to Holland Court). The
Court's reasoning is conclusory, but presumably the argument is that extension of the fair
cross-section requirement to the jury would preclude the use of peremptory challenges to
exclude members of groups defined in terms of race or the other listed factors because exclusion
of such groups would destroy the cross-sectional nature of the jury.
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elimination of peremptory challenges." Because the peremptory challenge
secures jury impartiality 6 and is intricately connected to the tradition of
jury trial, 37 the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment cannot be
interpreted to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges.3 1 Consequently,
the Holland Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not provide a valid
constitutional basis to challenge a prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors from a criminal defen-
dant's jury.39 The Court, however, was careful to suggest that the use of
peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from jury service is
illegal under the Court's analysis in Batson v. Kentucky.
40
In Batson v. Kentucky4' the Supreme Court reconsidered the evidentiary
burden imposed by prior case law on a criminal defendant who seeks to
demonstrate a denial of equal protection by the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors of the defendant's race from the
jury.4 2 An all-white jury convicted the black defendant, Batson, after the
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove all four blacks on the
venire.43 Batson contended that the prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges violated Batson's Sixth Amendment right to trial by
35. Id. at 809. The Holland Court reasoned that extension of the fair cross-section
requirement to the jury would require judges to attempt to "balance" the jury to ensure that
it represents a cross-section of diverse perspectives within the community. Id. (citing Lockhart
v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986). A litigant's use of peremptory challenges to remove
potential jurors perceived to be biased toward the litigant's interests destroys the cross-section
on the jury. Id. Therefore, extension of the fair cross-section requirement to the jury would
inevitably result in the elimination of peremptory challenges. Id.
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing Holland Court's conclusion
that peremptory challenge secures jury impartiality).
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (describing Holland Court's reference to
common law history and tradition of jury to interpret Sixth Amendment).
38. Id. at 808.
39. Id. at 811.
40. Id. at 810-11; see infra notes 41-59 (discussing Batson).
41. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
42. Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). Prior to the Batson Court's reconsid-
eration of the issue, the rule of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), governed criminal
defendants' claims of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. In Swain an Alabama trial
court convicted a black defendant of rape. Id. at 203. The prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to remove the six blacks on the venire available for jury service. Id. at 210. The
defendant offered evidence which tended to show that although the venires for criminal cases
normally included an average of six to seven blacks, no blacks had actually served on juries
in the 15 years prior to the defendant's trial. Id. at 205. The Court surveyed the history of
the development of the peremptory challenge and noted the important role the peremptory
challenge plays in the trial process. Id. at 212-19. Because of the importance of the peremptory
challenge, the Court refused to hold that the equal protection clause requires an investigation
of a prosecutor's motives in exercising peremptory challenges in any single case. Id. at 221-
22. Instead, the Swain Court suggested that a defendant must show the prosecution's systematic
use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time to establish a violation of
the defendant's right to equal protection. Id. at 227.
43. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
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an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. 44 The
Supreme Court, however, chose to address Batson's claim in terms of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles. 45
The Court initially noted that prior cases established that the equal
protection clause protects a defendant from discrimination against jurors of
the defendant's race in the composition of the venire.46 The Court reasoned
that discrimination in the composition of the venire harms the individual
defendant, the excluded jurors, and the entire community.47 The Court
further reasoned that racial discrimination in the selection of the jury also
harms the defendant, the excluded juror and the community. 4 Consequently,
the Batson Court held that the equal protection clause prohibits the pros-
ecution in a criminal trial from using peremptory challenges to exclude
jurors solely on account of race or on the assumption that jurors of the
defendant's race will be unable to judge impartially.4 9
The Batson Court then reassessed the prior rule requiring the defendant
to prove the prosecution's exclusion of jurors of the defendant's race over
a number of cases to establish a claim of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. 0 Rejecting the "crippling" evidentiary burden imposed by this
rule,-" the Court concluded that a defendant may establish a prima facie
case of discrimination in the selection of the jury by relying only on the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.52 The
Batson Court then formulated a new test for proving a prosecutor's dis-
criminatory exercise of peremptory challenges. 3 The -defendant first must
44. Id. at 84 n.4.
45. Id. The Batson Court expressly reserved ruling on Batson's Sixth Amendment claims.
Id. Writing for the Court in Holland, Justice Scalia noted the unprecedented nature of the
Batson Court's action in granting certiorari on one constitutional question and subsequently
deciding the case on another. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 811 n.3. (1990).
46. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 & n.7 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954);
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)).
47. Id. at 86-88. The Batson Court stated that racial discrimination in the selection of
the venire harms the defendant by denying the defendant the protection afforded by trial by
a jury of peers. Id. at 86 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). The
Court stated that discrimination in the composition of the venire harms the excluded juror by
denying the juror the opportunity to serve on a jury for reasons unrelated to the juror's ability
to serve. Id. at 87. Finally, the Batson Court stated that discriminatory jury selection procedures
harm the community by undermining public confidence in the fairness of the justice system.
Id.
48. Id. at 88. The Batson Court stated that the applicable principles in cases concerning
discrimination in the composition of the venire also forbid racial discrimination in the selection
of the jury. Id.
49. Id. at 89. The Batson Court expressly reserved decision on whether the discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel would violate the equal protection clause.
Id. n.12.
50. Id. at 90-93; see supra note 42 (describing pre-Batson test for establishing discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges).
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Id. at 96-98.
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show that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and that
the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to remove members of the
defendant's race from the venire. 54 The defendant then may rely on the fact
that peremptory challenges are subject to exercise in a discriminatory man-
ner.- 5 Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and all relevant
circumstances suggest that the prosecutor excluded potential jurors on the
basis of race.5 6 When the defendant makes such a showing, the burden of
proof shifts to the prosecution to offer a neutral explanation for challenging
jurors of the defendant's race.5 7 The Batson Court stated that an explanation
of exclusion only on the basis of presumed group bias is insufficient. 8 The
prosecutor's explanation, however, need not rise to a level justifying a
challenge for cause.5 9
IV. CIuTICIsM oF Holland
A. Mischaracterization of Central Purpose of Jury Trial as Derived from
Underlying Common Law History
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Holland mischaracterized
the central purpose of the right to trial by jury as derived from the common
law history underlying the Sixth AmendmentA° Given the meager constitu-
tional provisions for jury trial, 6' the Holland Court referred to underlying
common law history to determine the meaning of the Sixth Amendment
54. Id. at 96.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id.; see infra note 129 and accompanying text (describing group bias).
59. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; see supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing challenge
for cause).
60. See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (arguing that central purpose of Sixth
Amendment provision for trial by jury is protection of individual against government oppression
and not jury impartiality as Holland Court held).
61. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty
of Trial by Jury, 39 HA~v. L. REv. 917, 968-69 (1926) (characterizing constitutional provisions
for jury trial as meager).
The Constitution has only one reference to trial by jury, providing in pertinent part:
"The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... ." U.S.
CoNsr. art III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution also provide
for jury trial, providing in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. VI; "In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved .... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII. Although not securing a right of jury
trial, the Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury .. . .'" U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
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guarantee. 62 On this basis, the Holland Court concluded that the goal of
jury impartiality is the central purpose of the Sixth Amendment provision
for trial by jury.63 The history of the development of the jury, however,
suggests that the central purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
is to protect the individual against the exercise of arbitrary government
authority by interposing the judgment of a group of laymen between the
individual and the government. 64
Scholars long believed that the Magna Carta was the genesis of the
right to trial by jury." Historians now discount the Magna Carta as the
source of the right to jury trial" and instead find the roots of the jury in
Anglo-Saxon England. 67 The early English ancestors of the modem jury
62. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's reference to
role of peremptory challenge in common law history underlying Sixth Amendment to interpret
constitutional provision for trial by impartial jury); see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87,
108-09 (1925) (noting that constitutional language must be interpreted with reference to common
law and institutions existing at time of framing); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 61, at
968-69 (noting necessity of reference to historical background in application of constitutional
provisions for jury trial given fact that framers assumed certain meanings and consequently
incorporated meager textual guidance).
63. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's conclusion
that jury impartiality is central purpose of Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial given
role of peremptory challenge in common law history).
64. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-56 (1968) (surveying history of trial by
jury and concluding that Sixth Amendment grants right to trial by jury to criminal defendant
to prevent oppression by government); infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text (arguing that
history of development of jury suggests that protection of defendant is central purpose of
jury).
65. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 & n.16 (1968) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
CommENTrMs oN ThE LAws OF ENGLoN, 349 (Cooley ed. 1899), and stating that at time of
Constitution jury trial had been in existence in England for several centuries and that many
traced right of jury trial to Magna Carta); L. MooRE, THE JuRy: TOOL OF KINGs, PALLADiuM
OF LIBERTY, 47 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that Magna Carta is commonly credited source of
guarantee of trial by jury); J. PROFPATT, TRiAL BY JuRy, 35-36 (1877) (stating that common
and popular opinion is that Magna Carta secured trial by jury).
Scholars believed that the right of trial by jury derived from Article 39 of Magna Carta
which provides that "[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised, or outlawed, or
banished, or any ways destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor will we send upon him
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land" (quoted in L. MOORE,
supra, at 49).
66. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 n.16 (1968) (noting that contemporary
historians reject jury's "pedigree" traced to Magna Carta); Massaro, supra note 18, at 505
(noting that historians have shown that Magna Carta's reference to peers referred to special
right of members of elite class to be tried by their equals and not to jury as commonly known
today). But see L. MooRE, supra note 65, at 13-20, 48-49 (arguing that Frankish inquisition
was precursor of jury and that Article 36 of Magna Carta, which provides that "writ of
inquisition . .. shall be granted gratis, and shall not be denied," is provision guaranteeing
jury trial).
67. See J. Van Dyke, supra note 1, at 2 (finding roots of jury in Anglo-Saxon England);
J. PROFFATT, supra note 65, at 14-15 (finding early progenitors of jury in Anglo-Saxon sources).
But see L. Moort, supra note 65, at 1-21 (citing Greek, Roman, Scandinavian and Frankish
analogues of jury); J. PROFFATT, supra note 65, at 2-14 (same).
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developed because of practical concerns with the integrity and veracity of
the trial process.6 By enlisting neighbors of an individual who had knowl-
edge of the facts in issue to return an accusation or resolve a dispute, these
progenitors of the jury provided a more certain source of knowledge than
that available to a distant government official. 69
68. See Massaro, supra note 18, at 505-06 (noting that trial by jury developed as result
of practical necessity).
69. See Wells, Early Opposition to the Petty Jury in Criminal Cases, 30 L.Q. Rnv. 97,
105 (1914) (stating that jury's representative character was most important because jury used
members of community with knowledge of parties and dispute).
The early Anglo-Saxon ancestors of the jury evinced this representative character. See J.
PROFFATT, supra note 65, at 31 (referring to early ancestors of jury as system of popular
representation). The basis of the Anglo-Saxon judicial system was the tithing, which was a
representative group of ten people responsible for bringing its members to justice if guilty of
a crime or exonerating its members if innocent. L. MooaE, supra note 65, at 21-22. The higher
Anglo-Saxon county court also witnessed the development of the custom of referring matters
for trial to a number of its members who possessed knowledge of the person charged or
dispute in issue and who were sworn to give a true decision. J. PROPFATT, supra note 65, at
20-21. Because the members of these ancestors of the jury were representative of the community,
they would know the circumstances surrounding the dispute and be able to judge wisely. Wells,
supra, at 105. Although the "jurors" in the county court were sometimes sworn to decide an
issue, in both criminal and civil matters the Anglo-Saxon courts mainly served to accuse or
initiate the dispute resolution process; ultimate proof of guilt or liability was made by oath,
compurgation, ordeal or official witness. L. MooRE, supra note 65, at 26-30.
The jury underwent significant changes during the reign of William the Conqueror, but
the jury's purposes were still predominantly practical. See J. PROFFATr, supra note 65, at 30-
31 (describing simultaneous adaptation and retention of central characteristics of jury under
William). Upon William's defeat of Harold at the Battle of Hastings in 1066, William undertook
to rule the English by their then-existing laws. Id. William utilized inquests to determine the
laws of the English and to estimate the wealth and population of England, the results of the
inquests being recorded in the Domesday Book completed between 1081 and 1086. L. MOORE,
supra note 65, at 33. To utilize the inquest, the king sent his barons or justices into the
villages where they summoned important men from the vicinity :o testify under oath concerning
the laws or value and extent of all property holdings. Id. The king also commissioned such
justices to travel throughout the kingdom and administer justice. J. PROFFATT, supra note 65,
at 32. The citizens summoned by the justice would have knowledge of local affairs unknown
to the king's justice. See Wells, supra, at 105 (stating that jurors were chosen from community
because they would be likely to know circumstances surrounding dispute). Thus, in both the
inquests and the administration of the king's court the jury of local citizens summoned by the
justice served the practical function of providing the information needed by the justice to
satisfy his commission. See L. MooRE, supra note 65, at 37, 40 (describing self-informing
nature of jury in that jurors had personal knowledge of truth of matter in dispute).
Seeking to strengthen the king's presence in the countryside, Henry II laid the foundation
for the modern jury. J. VAN DYKE, supra note I, at 2. Henry II developed the inquest into
the ancestor of the modern grand jury by impaneling men to consider criminal cases and
accuse those suspected of crimes. Id. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 institutionalized these
procedures, providing that the men impaneled to return accusations should be from the local
villages and hundreds. Id. The Assize of Clarendon also provided a means of resolving civil
disputes over possession of land by enabling the jurors assembled from the villages to render
a verdict. L. MooR,, supra note 65, at 36. In both its accusatory and its judgmental roles,
the assize's use of jurors having knowledge of local affairs unknown to the king's justice
reflected practical concerns with the trial process. See id. at 37 (noting necessity of jurors'
preparedness by having knowledge of case).
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As the jury developed beyond the initial practical role in the trial
process,70 the jury came to represent a valuable protection of the individual
against the arbitrary exercise of government power.71 Although now com-
monly discounted as the source of the right to jury trial, 72 the Magna Carta
imposed a significant restraint on the scope of royal power by subjecting
the validity of the king's actions against his barons to the judgment of the
baron's peers. 73 A 1670 case involving William Penn and William Mead,
and a subsequent habeas corpus action arising from that case, established
the supremacy and independence of the jury verdict and the principle that
the jury could stand between the government and the accused.7 4 This
principle-that the jury could protect an individual against the arbitrary
70. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (discussing practical function in trial
process of early ancestors of jury). The jury procedure developed under William the Conqueror
and Henry II became more widely accepted as a mode of proof after Pope Innocent III
forbade trial by ordeal at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. See Groot, The Jury of
Presentment Before 1215, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST., 1, 1-2 (1982) (stating that jury method of
proof filled procedural void left by abolition of ordeal); Groot, The Early-Thirteenth-Century
Criminal Jury, in TwEvE GooD MEN AND TRUE 3 (J. Cockburn & T. Green eds. 1988)
(same).
71. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (noting that Declaration and Bill
of Rights of 1689 provided for jury trial because jury protected against arbitrary rule and
quoting Blackstone's characterization of jury as barrier between liberties of people and
prerogative of crown).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing demise of theory that Magna
Carta is source of right to jury trial).
73. See L. MooR., supra note 65, at 48 (noting that main purpose of Magna Carta was
to make king subject to law). Although Magna Carta elevated the barons' right to judgment
by their peers over the king's arbitrary exercise of power, the king retained considerable control
over the jury for several centuries. J. VAN DY CE, supra note 1, at 4. Use of juries of attaint
to overturn and punish unfavorable verdicts in civil cases and the Star Chamber to punish
unfavorable verdicts in criminal cases provided the crown with ready means to avoid the
consequences of an unfavorable judgment. J. PROFFATT, supra note 65, at 47-49, 57-59. Even
after the decline in use of juries of attaint, judges often rejected the jury's verdict or imprisoned
or fined jurors. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 4.
74. See 3. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing trial of Penn and Mead); L. MooRs,
supra note 65, at 83-86 (same). Penn and Mead, young Quaker Activists, were on trial for
conducting an unlawful assembly and disturbing the peace. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 5;
L. MooRE, supra note 65, at 83. The jury refused to return a guilty verdict against the two
even though the judges pressured them heavily, confining them for two days and nights without
food and drink. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 5; L. MooRE, supra note 65, at 83-85. The
Recorder then fined the jurors and imprisoned them until they paid the fine. J. VAN DYKE,
supra note 1, at 5; L. MooRE, supra note 65, at 85.
Edward Bushell, the leader of the recalcitrant jurors, obtained a writ of habeas corpus.
L. Moona, supra note 65, at 86. In the historic decision in Bushell's case, Chief Justice
Vaughan stated that jurors cannot be punished for their verdict. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1,
at 5. The Chief Justice emphasized that the purpose of the jury is to evaluate the evidence
presented in the light of the jurors' understanding, reasoning and conscience. Id. In 1681 a
grand jury asserted a similar independence when it refused to return an indictment for treason
against the Earl of Shaftesbury. Id. The royal authorities eventually obtained an indictment
from another grand jury, but this decision and the decision in Bushell's case firmly established
the principle that a jury could stand between an accused and the king. Id.
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exercise of government power-was the reason that the American colonists
greatly valued and jealously guarded the right of trial by jury.
71
The common law history of the development of the right to jury trial
includes the history of the unique function of the jury as a protection
against arbitrary government power,76 as well as the history of the peremp-
tory challenge." The Holland Court, however, focused solely on the role
of the peremptory challenge"8 in the common law history underlying the
Sixth Amendment and, consequently, equated the central purpose of the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial with the goal of jury impartiality.
79
But the history of the development of the right to jury trial, 0 especially
the early colonists' solicitude for the preservation of this right,8' suggests
that the central purpose of the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision is the
protection of the individual defendant against government oppression. 2 The
75. See Massaro, supra note 18, at 508 (stating that principal reason colonists highly
prized right to jury trial was their belief that lay juries would prevent arbitrary exercise of
government authority). The American colonists considered the right to jury trial a fundamental
right. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 6. Revolutionary and constitutional documents of the
time illustrate the colonists' high regard for the right of trial by jury. L. MooPE, supra note
65, at 99-104. Most of the colonial charters guaranteed trial by jury. Id. at 95-97. The
Declaration of Rights of the First Continental Congress of 1774 claimed for the colonists the
"inestimable privilege" of trial by a jury of peers. Id. at 99. The Declaration of Independence
listed the crown's deprivation of the benefits of trial by jury as one of the reasons for
separation from England.- Id. at 100. The first constitutions of most of the thirteen original
states incorporated provisions preserving the right of trial by jury. Id. at 99-102.
Early colonial writers often were effusive in their praise of the jury. See Massaro, supra
note 18, at 508 (describing colonists' "expansive rhetoric" used to describe right to jury trial).
Hamilton noted that opponents of the Constitution objecting to the lack of provision for jury
trial in civil cases considered trial by jury to be "the palladium of free government." TmE
FEDERAuST No. 83, at 521-22 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). Jefferson characterized the
jury as "the only anchor ever yet imagined" which could hold government to its constitutional
foundations. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting letter of Jefferson to Thomas
Paine).
76. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing common law history of
development of jury's role in protection of individual liberty).
77. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 808 & n.1 (1990) (discussing role of peremptory
challenge in common law history underlying Sixth Amendment).
78. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's analysis of
function of peremptory challenge).
79. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's conclusion
that impartiality is central purpose of Sixth Amendment provision for trial by jury).
80. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (summarizing common law history of
development of right of trial by jury).
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing early American colonists'
attitude toward right of jury trial).
82. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 814 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing between separate "impartiality" concern and concern with "jury" as substantive
constitutional concept inherent in Sixth Amendment and arguing that Holland majority's
assumption that impartiality is sole purpose of Sixth Amendment is "flatly false"); Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), for
proposition that purpose of jury trial is prevention of government oppression); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that purpose of jury is to guard against the
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
requirement that the jury be impartial facilitates the central protective
purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial by ensuring that the
group of laymen assembled for judgment are impartial toward the accused.83
The impartiality requirement, however, is not itself the central purpose of
the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision.
4
B. Inconsistency with Prior Cases Recognizing Central Purpose of Sixth
Amendment
In addition to the inconsistency with common law history of the jury,
the Holland decision also is inconsistent with the Court's prior precedents
interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, The Holland Court's
assertion that jury impartiality is the central purpose of the right to trial
by jury contradicts the Court's prior cases interpreting the Sixth Amend-
ment."5 In numerous cases the Court has recognized the unique role that
the jury plays in the protection of individual liberties against government
oppression.16 In each of these cases the Court has stated that the purpose
of the jury is to protect the accused against arbitrary government action.87
The Court first explicitly recognized the unique role the jury plays in
the protection of individual liberties in Duncan v. Louisiana."" In Duncan
the Supreme Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment right of trial
by jury is a fundamental right entitled to protection against state abridge-
ment under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. 89 In analyzing
exercise of arbitrary power); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and stating that purpose of jury trial is prevention of
government oppression); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 100 (same); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. at 151-56 (surveying history of trial by jury and concluding that Sixth Amendment
secured right to trial by jury to defendant to prevent oppression by government).
83. See J. VAN DYKa, supra note 1, at 47 (stating that by use of term "impartial"
framers contemplated jury that was fair because not biased in favor of prosecution and
independent of outside influence).
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (arguing that protection of individual
defendant against government oppression is central purpose of right to jury trial); cf. Holland
v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 814 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between separate
"impartiality" concern and concern with "jury" as substantive constitutional concept inherent
in Sixth Amendment).
85. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 818 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that Holland majority has "selective amnesia" because majority glosses over every single fair
cross-section case decided by Court).
86. See infra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases
interpreting Sixth Amendment and emphasizing protective function of jury).
87. See infra notes 92, 104, 117 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court cases
reasoning that protection of defendant is central purpose of jury secured by Sixth Amendment).
88. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
89. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In Duncan, a Louisiana court tried
and convicted the defendant, Gary Duncan, of simple battery without a jury in accordance
with Louisiana law. Id. at 146. Under Louisiana law at the time, simple battery was a
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment and a $300 fine. Id. Upon
conviction, the court sentenced Duncan to 60 days in the parish prison and fined Duncan
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this question, the Court briefly surveyed the history immediately preceding
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment9 and concluded that the right to trial
by jury protects the criminal defendant from government oppression. 9' The
Court reasoned that the right of jury trial interposes the common sense
judgment of the defendant's peers between the defendant and the govern-
ment and, thus, protects the defendant against the arbitrary exercise of
government power.9 Because of the protective function of the jury93 and
the deep national commitment to the right of jury trial reflected in state
and federal constitutions, 94 the Duncan Court held that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from abridging the
right of a criminal defendant to jury trial in serious criminal cases. 9
After Duncan, the Supreme Court considered the specific contours of
the right of trial by jury that the Sixth Amendment secures and that Duncan
made applicable to the states.9 In Williams v. Florida97 the Court considered
whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees trial by no less than twelve
jurors. 9s In Apodaca v. Oregon" the Court considered whether the Sixth
$150. Id. Duncan contended on appeal that the right of jury trial in criminal cases is a
fundamental right which is essential to a fair trial. Id. at 148-49 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963)). The State of Louisiana contended that the United States
Constitution imposes no duty on the states to provide a jury trial in any criminal case. Id. at
149.
90. Id. at 151-54.
91. Id. at 155; see also id. at 188 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that principal original
virtue of jury trial was limitations which jury imposed on judiciary).
92. Id. at 156. The Duncan Court noted that the provision for trial by a jury of peers
gives the accused an "inestimable safeguard" against a corrupt or overzealous prosecutor or
a biased judge by substituting the common sense judgment of the jury for the professional,
but possibly less sympathetic, reaction of the judge. Id.
93. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (describing protective function of jury).
94. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-56 (1968). The Duncan Court noted that
the provision for jury trial in both federal and state constitutions reflects a reluctance to
entrust complete power over a citizen's life and liberty to a single judge or group of judges.
Id. at 156.
95. Id. at 149, 156. The Duncan Court recognized that the trial of certain offenses
without a jury would not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 159. Thus, the Court held that
petty crimes or offenses carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury
trial. Id.
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (describing Duncan Court's application of
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial to states through incorporation in Fourteenth Amendment).
97. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
98. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). In Williams, the defendant filed a
motion prior to his trial for robbery to impanel a jury of twelve instead of a jury of six as
provided by Florida law. Id. at 79-80. The Court surveyed the history underlying the inclusion
of specific provisions for jury trial in the Constitution and amendments and concluded that
this history is ambiguous as to whether those provisions guarantee a jury identical to the jury
that existed at common law at the time of the Constitution. Id. at 92-99. Because the import
of this history is ambiguous, the Court reasoned that the question of whether a particular
feature of the jury is of constitutional significance must be resolved by reference to the
function that the feature performs in relation to the purpose of the jury trial. Id. at 99-100.
99. 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion).
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Amendment requires conviction of a defendant only upon a unanimous
verdict.1 0° In both cases the Court surveyed the history underlying the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment and concluded that this history is
ambiguous concerning the framers' intent to preserve specific features of
the jury existing at common law. 10' Consequently, the Court reasoned that
the relation of a given feature of the jury'02 to the purpose of the jury
determines whether the Constitution requires the particular feature. 03 The
purpose of the jury, the Court concluded, is to protect the individual
defendant against government oppression, as noted in Duncan.'04 Indeed,
the Court maintained that the essential feature of the jury is the interposition
of the common sense judgment of the defendant's peers between the
defendant and the government.105 The- Court reasoned that neither a jury
of six instead of twelve jurors nor a less-than-unanimous verdict undermines
the common sense judgment of the jury.16 Consequently, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment requires neither trial by a twelve-member jury
nor conviction by a unanimous verdict.1 7
100. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (plurality opinion). In Apodaca various
petitioners appealed criminal convictions by less-than-unanimous jury verdicts. Id. at 405-06.
The Court noted the similarity between the issues of the constitutional significance of the
unanimity requirement presented in Apodaca and the number requirement presented in Wil-
liams. Id. at 406. As in Williams, the Court noted the ambiguity of the history underlying the
adoption of the Sixth Amendment and concluded that the constitutional significance of the
unanimity feature of the jury must be determined by reference to the purpose of the jury. Id.
at 407-10.
101. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 96-100; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 407-410.
102. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 86 (considering constitutional significance of
number requirement for jury); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 406 (considering constitutional
significance of unanimity requirement for jury).
103. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at
410.
104. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. at 410.
105. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
410 (1972).
106. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-02 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
410-11 (1972); see supra note 92 and accompanying text (describing role of common sense
judgment of jury in protection of individual defendant).
The Williams Court reasoned that a reduction in the number of jurors would not
undermine the common sense judgment of the jury as long as the number of jurors remained
large enough to allow group deliberation and provide the possibility for representation of a
fair cross-section of the community. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. Although the Williams Court
held that a six member jury is constitutionally acceptable, the Court later refused to allow a
further reduction in number to a five member jury. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 228
(1978).
Following a chain of reasoning similar to that in Williams, the Apodaca Court concluded
that the unanimity requirement does not materially contribute to the common sense judgment
of the jury. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410. The Court reasoned that allowing a jury to convict
or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one still effectively interposes the judgment of the
defendant's peers between the defendant and the state. Id. at 410-11.
107. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406
(1972).
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The Court also referred to the protective function of the jury in Taylor
v. Louisiana.0 8 In Taylor the Court considered whether a state jury selection
system that operated to exclude women from jury service violated a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial.109 Because Louisiana
constitutional and statutory provisions precluded the selection of women
for jury service absent the filing of a written declaration of desire to serve," 0
the jury wheel for the district in which Taylor's trial occurred contained
few women, and the venire for Taylor's trial contained no women."'
Consequently, an all male jury tried and convicted Taylor of aggravated
kidnaping.1 2 Taylor contended that Louisiana's jury selection procedures
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a cross-section
of the community." 3
The Court initially noted that the fact that Taylor was not a member
of the excluded class of jurors did not preclude Taylor from challenging
the exclusion of women from his venire.14 The Court then surveyed its
prior cases interpreting the right of jury trial and concluded that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of trial by an impartial jury requires that the jury
be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.' The Court
108. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
109. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1975).
110. Id. at 523, nn.1, 2. At the time defendant Taylor was tried, the Louisiana Constitution
provided that "no woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously
filed with the clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to
such service." Id. at 523 n.l (quoting LA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 41). The Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure also provided that "[a] woman shall not be selected for jury service unless
she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she resides a written
declaration' of her desire to be subject to jury service." Id. at 523 n.2 (quoting LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 402). Both of these provisions were repealed as of January 1, 1975. Id. at
523 nn.1, 2.
111. Id. at 524. The Court noted that Louisiana's jury selection system did not disqualify
women from jury service, but that the jury selection system did operate to systematically
exclude women from jury service. Id. at 525-26. Thus, although women constituted 53% of
the eligible jurors in the district in which Taylor's trial occurred, only 10% of the persons on
the jury wheel and none of the persons on the defendant's venire were women. Id. at 524.
112. Id. at 524.
113. Id. at 526.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 526-28. The representative or fair cross-section requirement is implicit within
the Sixth Amendment provision for trial by jury. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807
(1990). The Taylor Court traced the development of this implicit requirement in the Court's
prior cases. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1975). The Court cited the following
cases: Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (stating that jury must be body truly
representative of community in context of claim that systematic exclusion of blacks from grand
jury violates defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of laws); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) (interpreting Sixth Amendment to require that jury
be representative body which reflects cross-section of community); Ballard v. United States
329 U.S. 187 (1946) (noting federal statutory design to make jury reflect cross-section of
community); Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953) (declaring state source of jury lists
acceptable if source reasonably reflects cross-section of population suitable in character and
intelligence for jury duty); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (quoting Smith
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reasoned that the Sixth Amendment requires selection of jurors from a fair
cross-section of the community because this requirement preserves the
common sense judgment of the jury by ensuring that the jury's judgment
reflects the viewpoints of distinct groups within the community.116 The
common sense judgment. of the jury in turn protects the individual against
the exercise of arbitrary government power-the central purpose of the
jury. 1 7 Because women bring a unique perspective to the jury, the Taylor
Court held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury service violates
the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement.' The Court was
that idea of jury contemplates body truly representative of community); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (stating that number on jury should be large enough to provide fair
possibility for obtaining representative cross-section of the community); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (plurality opinion) (noting that jury will exercise common sense
judgment as long as jury consists of group of laymen representative of cross-section of
community who have duty and opportunity to deliberate on question of defendant's guilt);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and
Stewart, JJ.) (noting that Sixth Amendment comprehends fair possibility of obtaining jury
constituting representative cross-section of community).
After surveying these cases, the Taylor Court concluded that the fair cross-section
requirement is an "essential component" of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial which is
"fundamental" to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. at 528-30; see also Daughtrey, supra note 11, at 19-50 (providing exhaustive summary
of development of jury cross-section requirement).
116. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530. The Taylor Court's language is significant.
The Court reasoned:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make
available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge. [citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)] This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool
is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups
are excluded from the pool.... Restricting jury service to only special groups or
excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial. "Trial by jury presupposes a
jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial
in a specific case.... Mhe broad representative character of the jury should be
maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing
in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility."
Id. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
117. Id. at 530. The Taylor Court referred to other functions of the jury, but the Court
obviously perceived the protective role to be the central purpose of the jury. Id. The Court
stated that "Itihe purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power ....
Community participation in the administration of the criminal law... is also critical to public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system." Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 533, 535-36. The Taylor Court noted that distinct groups bring unique
perspectives to the jury which are vital to the judgment of the jury and possibly of critical
importance in individual cases. Id. at 531-32. In deciding that women constitute a distinctive
group for jury representation purposes, the Taylor Court noted that the two sexes are "not
fungible." Id. (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)). The Court
further noted that the influence of the sexes upon each other is "imponderable" and that a
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careful to note, however, that its holding imposed no requirement that the
jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community must reflect the
various distinct groups in the community."l 9
C. Discriminatory Exercise of Peremptory Challenges Undermines
Protective Function of Jury that is Central Purpose of Sixth Amendment
Both a survey of the common law history underlying the Sixth Amend-
ment and an analysis of Supreme Court cases interpreting the Sixth Amend-
ment provision for jury trial demonstrate that the central purpose of the
jury is to protect the individual defendant against the arbitrary exercise of
government power.'2 The Sixth Amendment provision for trial by an
impartial jury, therefore, must be interpreted in light of this purpose.'
2 '
Given this context, impartiality is an important feature of the jury because
the requirement of impartiality protects the accused against government
oppression. 22 Although peremptory challenges aid in impaneling an impartial
jury,123 if the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges undermines
the central protective function of the jury, then such use of peremptories
should be prohibited as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.'2
distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded from the jury. Id.
The Taylor Court also intimated that the exclusion of distinct groups other than women
from jury service would violate the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement. Id. at
532. Thus the Court aptly reasoned:
[T]he exclusion from jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of
citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive to admit of
confinement to particular issues or particular cases.
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknow-
able. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as
a class in order to conclude ... that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective
on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented.
Id. at 532 n.12 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-504 (1972) (opinion of Marshall,
J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, JJ.)).
119. Id. at 538.
120. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (surveying common law history under-
lying Sixth Amendment); supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court
cases interpreting Sixth Amendment).
121. Cf. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 808 (1990) (stating that constitutional phrase
"impartial jury" must derive meaning from tradition of peremptory challenge and concluding
that goal of jury impartiality is central purpose of Sixth Amendment).
122. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing relation of requirement of jury
impartiality to central protective function of jury); cf. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. at 814-
15 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting distinction between Sixth Amendment requirement of
impartiality and provision for "jury" trial and suggesting that impartiality requirement and
fair cross-section requirement based on provision for "jury" trial provide distinct protections).
123. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (describing function of peremptory
challenge in securing impartial jury).
124. But see Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. at 806 (holding that prohibition on exclusion
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A party need give no reason when exercising a peremptory challenge to
remove a potential juror. 2' As one court has noted, however, because no
reason need be given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge does not
mean that no reason need exist."26 Thus, a party properly exercises a
peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror when the party believes
the juror exhibits a specific bias toward the particular parties or witnesses
in a case. 27 By enabling a party to reject a juror on the basis of real or
perceived partiality not rising to the level of legal bias and justifying a
challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge eliminates extremes of parti-
ality on both sides and secures an impartial jury.128
of cognizable groups through peremptory challenges has no basis in Sixth Amendment); Note,
The Impartiality Requirement of the Sixth Amendment and Peremptory Challenges: Holland
v. Illinois, 24 C=moHroN L. REv. 339 (1990) (arguing that Holland Court correctly refused to
apply fair cross-section requirement to jury).
125. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (stating that essential nature of
peremptory challenge is that peremptory is exercised without stating reason, without inquiry,
and without being subject to court's control); supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing
exercise of peremptory challenge without stating reason).
126. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274, 583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901
(1978). In Wheeler, the Supreme Court of California considered whether the prosecution's use
of peremptory challenges to remove all black potential jurors from two black defendants' jury
violated the defendants' right under the California Constitution to trial by an impartial jury.
Id. at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. In the course of its opinion, the
California court surveyed its own and the United States Supreme Court's cases developing the
fair cross-section requirement. Id. at 266-72, 583 P.2d at 754-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-99.
From this survey, the court concluded that both Article I, Section 16 of the California
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantee the right
to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Id. at 272, 583
P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-90. The court maintained that the rationale for the cross-
section requirement is that the cross-section requirement achieves an impartial jury by encour-
aging a representation of diverse groups on the jury so that inherent and unavoidable group
biases-the beliefs and values resulting from jurors' group experiences-cancel each other out.
Id. at 266-67, 276, 583 P.2d at 754-55, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896, 902. Because the fair cross-
section requirement contemplates an interaction of diverse group biases, the Wheeler court
held that the exercise of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the
basis of group bias violates a defendant's constitutional right to trial by a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community. Id. at 266-67, 276, 583 P.2d at 755, 761-62, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 896, 902. In contrast to the impropriety of using peremptory challenges to remove
potential jurors on the basis of group bias, the court concluded that peremptory challenges
are proper only when used to remove jurors with a specific bias toward the particular case on
trial or the parties or witnesses to that case. Id. at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
901.
127. Id. at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901; see Note, supra note 14, at 1733
(arguing that jurors should be challenged peremptorily because counsel believes that jurors
harbor situation-specific biases and not because jurors are members of group likely to represent
distinctive perspectives within community).
128. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 807, 809 (1990) (describing use of peremptory
challenges to exclude extremes of partiality); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219-20 (describing
nature and function of peremptory challenges); Saltzburg and Powers, supra note 15, at 341-
42 (stating that theory of peremptory challenge is that each side will exercise peremptories to
remove jurors biased in favor of opposition thus resulting in impartial jury); Note, supra note
14, at 1718-19 (stating that party should exercise peremptory challenges to remove jurors
harboring bias not sufficient to justify challenge for cause).
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In contrast to specific bias, group bias is the shared attitudes or
perspectives that a person possesses as a result of membership in a distinct
and identifiable group within the community.12 9 The Supreme Court has
held that the state's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude potential
jurors from service on a jury solely on the basis of group bias violates a
criminal defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of
the laws. 30 In Holland, however, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
does not prohibit the state's exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis
of group bias.' The Holland Court's refusal to find a Sixth Amendment
basis for prohibiting the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges is
illogical given the central protective purpose of the jury3 2 and the Court's
prior recognition of the prohibition against systematic exclusion of distinct
groups from jury panels or venires on the basis of group bias.'
Prior to Holland, various state courts had found that the exercise of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors from a jury solely on
the basis of group bias violates either the Sixth Amendment or state
constitutional provisions. 3 4 These courts reasoned that group bias actually
serves an integral function in ensuring jury impartiality by allowing the
divergent opinions and perspectives of different jurors to reciprocally influ-
129. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902
(describing group bias); Note, supra note 14, at 1733 (same).
130. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986); see supra notes 41-59 and accompanying
text (discussing Batson).
131. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 806 (1990).
132. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (concluding that survey of common law
history underlying Sixth Amendment and Supreme Court cases interpreting Sixth Amendment
suggests that central purpose of jury is protection of individual against government oppression).
133. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (stating that exclusion of large
groups from venire violates purposes of fair cross-section requirement); infra notes 140-143
and accompanying text (discussing McCree). In the course of its opinion, the McCree Court
discussed its prior jury representation cases. Id. at 175. The Court reasoned that these cases
implicitly condemn the exclusion of large groups such as blacks, women, and Mexican-
Americans from jury service because the exclusion of these groups for reasons unrelated to
the ability of their members to serve as jurors in a particular case contravenes the purposes
of the fair cross-section requirement. Id. In contrast to the unacceptable exclusion of jurors
on the basis of group bias, the Court approved of the exclusion of jurors with specific biases
which prevent them from impartially applying the law in a given case because such biases are
attributes within the control of the jurors. Id. at 175-76.
134. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 903 (1978) (holding that both Sixth Amendment to Federal Constitution and Article I,
Section 16, of California Constitution guarantee right to trial by jury drawn from representative
cross-section of community and that use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors
on sole ground of group bias violates right to trial by jury drawn from cross-section of
community); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, -, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (holding
that exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude members of discrete groups from jury solely
on basis of bias presumed from membership in group contravenes requirement inherent in
Article 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights that jury be drawn from fair and represen-
tative cross-section of community), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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ence and offset each other, thus avoiding extremes of prejudice.13 These
courts thus interpreted the fair cross-section requirement, whether derived
from the Sixth Amendment or state constitutional provisions, in a substan-
tive sense'36 to guarantee the defendant a right to an impartial jury (a jury
that balances and mediates jurors' diverse group biases)137 and not just a
jury composed of impartial jurors (jurors exhibiting no specific biases toward
the case or parties).3 8
If the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment guarantees
a defendant the substantive right to an impartial jury, then the use of
peremptory challenges to remove members of distinct groups from the jury
destroys the jury's impartiality and violates the Sixth Amendment by up-
setting the balance of group biases and subjecting the jury to the prejudices
of the majority.3 9 The Supreme Court, however, expressly rejected this
substantive interpretation of the right to an impartial jury in Lockhart v.
McCree.140 In McCree the Supreme Court considered whether the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section requirement prohibits the removal for cause
of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong
that the jurors would be unable to impose the death penalty at the sentencing
phase of trial.141 The McCree Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
135. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 366-67, 583 P.2d 748, 755, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 896 (1978) (noting that representation of variety of groups on jury so antagonistic biases
of group members "cancel each other out" is only practical way to achieve overall impartiality
on jury); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, -, 387 N.E.2d 499, 512 (quoting
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975)) (noting that assurance of diversity of
individual jurors' opinions as influenced by group affiliation assures "diffused impartiality"
on jury which is key objective of representative cross-section requirement), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979); see also Note, supra note 14, at 1733 (stating that rationale behind represen-
tative cross-section rule in Taylor is that impartial jury is one in which group biases have
opportunity to interact).
136. See Note, supra note 14, at 1726 (arguing that representative cross-section requirement
is concerned with substantive definition of jury impartiality); Massaro, supra note 18, at 543
(arguing that Sixth Amendment right to "impartial jury" and component of this right that
assures that jurors be "impartial" are independent concepts).
137. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
902 (1978) (stating that interaction of jurors' diverse beliefs and values derived from group
experiences achieves overall impartiality of jury).
138. See id. at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (equating impartial jurors
with jurors having no specific biases toward case or parties); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162, 177 (1986) (defining impartial jurors as jurors who can lay aside impressions or opinions
and render verdict based on evidence presented at trial and quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 723 (1961)).
139. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902
(stating that removing jurors because jurors hold beliefs derived from group experiences
precludes interaction of diverse perspectives and subjects jury to domination by conscious or
unconscious prejudices of majority).
140. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
141. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986). An Arkansas state court jury convicted
the defendant, McCree, of capital felony murder but sentenced McCree to life imprisonment
without parole. Id. at 166. The trial judge had removed for cause at voir dire all prospective
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to an impartial jury guarantees only the right to trial by a jury composed
of impartial jurors who are able to decide a case solely on the evidence
adduced at trial.' 42 The Court refused to interpret the impartial jury re-
quirement in a substantive sense, reasoning that such an interpretation
would require trial judges to undertake the impractical task of balancing
various viewpoints on a jury, and, ultimately, would eliminate the peremp-
tory challenge. 43
Although the McCree Court refused to interpret the Sixth Amendment
provision for an impartial jury to encompass the concept of a balancing of
diverse group biases on the jury,' 44 the Court recognized the impropriety of
excluding jurors from jury panels or venires on the basis of group bias.
4
5
The Court reasoned that exclusion of entire groups from jury service possibly
could undermine the common sense judgment of the jury that protects the
jurors who stated that they could not vote for the imposition of the death penalty under any
circumstances. Id. McCree contended that the exclusion of these jurors opposed to the death
penalty violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury selected from a
representative cross-section of the community. Id. at 167. The Court noted that its prior cases
had interpreted the fair cross-section requirement to apply only to the jury panel or venire
and not the jury. Id. at 173 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 '(1979), and
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). The Court reasoned that application of the
fair cross-section requirement to the jury would be unworkable because trial judges would
have to "balance" juries to reflect the various groups in the community. Id. at 178. The
Court also expressed fear that extension of the fair cross-section requirement to the jury would
ultimately require the elimination of peremptory challenges. Id. at 178-79. Consequently, the
McCree Court held that the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement does not apply
to the jury to prohibit the removal for cause of jurors adamantly opposed to the death penalty.
Id. at 174.
142. Id. at 177-78 (citing Irvin v. Dowd 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)). But see Massaro,
supra note 18, at 542 (stating that if term "impartial" in Sixth Amendment means only that
jurors must be impartial, then term arguably is redundant because due process clause requires
impartial tribunal).
143. McCree, 476 U.S. at 178-79. But see Note, supra note 14, at 1732 (noting that fair
cross-section requirement demands only that defendant have jury from which no group has
been excluded by peremptory challenges of prospective jurors on basis of group associations).
In the course of its opinion, the McCree Court succinctly summarized the theory of a
substantive right to an impartial jury and clearly rejected that theory. The Court's language
is instructive:
McCree's "impartiality" argument apparently is based on the theory that, because
all individual jurors are to some extent predisposed towards one result or another,
a constitutionally impartial jury can be constructed only by "balancing" the various
predispositions of the individual jurors .... We have consistently rejected this view
of jury impartiality, including as recently as last Term when we squarely held that
an impartial jury consists of nothing more than "jurors who will conscientiously
apply the law and find the facts." [citation omitted].
In our view, it is simply not possible to define jury impartiality, for constitu-
tional purposes, by reference to some hypothetical mix of individual viewpoints.
McCree, 476 U.S. at 177-78, 183 (emphasis in original).
144. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (describing McCree Court's rejection
of substantive interpretation of impartial jury).
145. McCree, 476 U.S. at 175.
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criminal defendant.' 46 Reaching a similar conclusion in Taylor v. Louis-
iana,47 the Supreme Court concluded that the jury cannot perform its
unique protective function if large, distinct groups within the community
are excluded from the jury pool. 148 Implicit in the Taylor Court's reasoning
is the premise that a jury composed of only special segments of the
community reflects the judgment of those segments and not the common
sense judgment of the community which shields the defendant from gov-
ernment oppression. 49
The Holland Court erred by concluding that the Sixth Amendment
provides no basis for a prohibition on the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges to remove jurors solely on the grounds of group bias. 50 A survey
of the common law history underlying the Sixth Amendment'5 and an
analysis of the Supreme Court's cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment
provision for jury trial 52 demonstrate that the central purpose of the jury
is to protect the individual defendant against the arbitrary exercise of
government power.'53 The jury protects the defendant by interposing the
common sense judgment of the community between the defendant and the
government. 54 The Court has recognized that exclusion of distinct groups
from jury service undermines the common sense judgment of the community
provided by the jury. 5  The application of the common sense judgment of
146. Id.
147. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (discussing
Taylor).
148. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
149. See id. (noting that absence of distinct groups within community undermines common
sense judgment of jury); supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Taylor Court's
reasoning that exclusion of distinct groups from jury service violates Sixth Amendment fair
cross-section requirement). But see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371-72 n.* (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (attacking view that distinct groups bring unique perspectives to
jury and arguing that fair cross-section requirement really reflects equal protection concerns).
The Taylor Court stated that restricting jury service to special groups or excluding major
segments within the community "cannot be squared" with the constitutional concept of jury
trial. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
150. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (arguing that discriminatory exercise
of peremptory challenges undermines central protective function of Sixth Amendment provision
for jury trial and, consequently, that discriminatory peremptories should be prohibited as
violation of Sixth Amendment).
151. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text (surveying common law history under-
lying Sixth Amendment).
152. See supra notes 88-119 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court's cases
interpreting Sixth Amendment).
153. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (concluding from survey of common law
history and analysis of Supreme Court cases that central purpose of Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial is protection of individual defendant against government oppression).
154. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing Duncan Court's description of
function of jury's common sense judgment in protection of individual defendant).
155. See supra notes 129-49 and accompanying text (discussing McCree and Taylor Courts'
recognition of effect of group bias-based discrimination in composition of venire on jury's
common sense judgment).
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the community, however, occurs on the jury and not the venire.15 6 Thus,
the Holland Court's holding is illogical in maintaining that the fair cross-
section requirement of the Sixth Amendment prohibits the systematic exclu-
sion of distinct groups from the venire while simultaneously allowing the
destruction of the cross-section on the jury through the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges. 157 The exercise of peremptory challenges solely
on the basis of group bias should be prohibited as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment because such discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges
defeats the central purpose of the jury.
V. NARROWER SCOPE OF PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION UNDER
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
By restricting claims concerning discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges to a Batson equal protection analysis instead of a Sixth Amendment
156. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (noting that interaction of cross-section of community occurs not within venire
but on jury selected from venire); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, -, 387 N.E.2d
499, 513 (noting that representative venire or panel is insufficient if jury is not representative
because desired interaction of cross-section of community occurs only within jury room), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); Note, supra note 14, at 1731 (noting that interplay of group
perspectives occurs only on jury).
In McCray, Justice Marshall succinctly stated the argument for precluding the discrimi-
natory exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of the Sixth Amendment:
The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is rendered
meaningless if the State is permitted to utilize several peremptory challenges to
exclude all Negroes from the jury .... The desired interaction of a cross-section of
the community does not take place within the venire; it is only effectuated by the
jury that is selected and sworn to try the issues. The systematic exclusion of
prospective jurors because of their race is therefore unconstitutional at any stage of
the jury selection process. There is no point in taking elaborate steps to ensure that
Negroes are included on venires simply so they can then be struck because of their
race by a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.
McCray, 461 U.S. at 967-68.
157. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 825 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that Sixth Amendment guarantees defendant impartial jury and not just impartial venire).
The concurrence of Justice White and Justice Rehnquist in the majority's opinion in
Holland is particularly puzzling given their earlier position in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972) (plurality opinion). In Apodaca Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's opinion
which at least implicitly acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment precludes the exclusion of
jurors from the jury, as well as the venire, on the basis of group bias. In Apodaca the Court
considered whether the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial prohibits conviction by a less-
than-unanimous verdict. Id. at 406. Justice White addressed the petitioner's argument that a
less-than-unanimous verdict undermines the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement
by allowing conviction without the acquiescence of minority elements within the community.
Id. at 412-13. Justice White dismissed this argument because the Sixth Amendment does not
require representation of "every distinct voice in the community ... on every jury." Id. at
413. Instead, Justice White wrote that "the Constitution forbids ... systematic exclusion of
identifiable segments of the community from jury panels and from the juries ultimately drawn
from those panels .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
fair cross-section analysis," 8 the Holland Court effectively narrowed the
scope of constitutional protection against discrimination in the jury selection
process. The Sixth Amendment fair cross-section analysis and the Batson
equal protection analysis of claims involving discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges differ in several ways.5 9 Specifically, the two analyses differ
with respect to standing requirements,' 6° the scope of cognizable groups to
which the protections apply,' 6' and the necessary prerequisite of state ac-
tion. 62 In each of these respects, the fair cross-section analysis provides a
broader scope of protection against discriminatory jury selection procedures.
A. Different Standing Requirements for Equal Protection and Fair
Cross-Section Analyses
The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and Sixth Amendment
fair cross-section analyses of claims of discriminatory jury selection proce-
dures have different standing requirements. A defendant need not be a
member of a group allegedly excluded from the jury as a result of the
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to have standing to allege
a violation of the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement. 63 Tra-
158. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 810-11 (1990) (holding that defendant has
no valid constitutional challenge on basis of Sixth Amendment to prosecution's race-based use
of peremptory challenges but that such use of peremptory challenges is unlawful under Batson);
supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text (discussing Batson); supra notes 39-40 and accom-
panying text (discussing Holland Court's default to Batson analysis for claims of discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges).
159. See generally Magid, Challenges to Jury Composition: Purging the Sixth Amendment
Analysis of Equal Protection Concepts, 24 SAN Dmoo L. Rv. 1081 (1987) (contrasting
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and Sixth Amendment fair cross-section analyses of
jury discrimination claims and arguing that only Sixth Amendment analysis fully protects
defendAnt's right to trial by impartial jury); Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection,
the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges,
37 EMORY L.J. 755 (1988) (distinguishing between equal protection and fair cross-section
analyses, arguing that Batson correctly adopted equal protection analysis, and advocating
reduction in number of peremptories and expansion of counsel's role in voir dire to facilitate
equal protection against discriminatory jury selection procedures).
160. See infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text (discussing different standing require-
ments for fair cross-section and equal protection analyses).
161. See infra notes 175-90 and accompanying text (discussing differing definition of
cognizable groups for fair cross-section and equal protection claims).
162. See infra notes 191-236 and accompanying text (discussing state action requirement
inherent in equal protection analysis and lack of state action requirement for fair cross-section
analysis).
163. See Magid, supra note 159, at 1091 (stating that defendant need not be member of
excluded group to bring fair cross-section claim).
The Holland Court found that a white defendant had standing to contest the exclusion
of black jurors. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 805-06 (1990). The Court stated that the
Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to contest a venire not designed to represent a fair
cross-section of the community, whether or not the defendant belongs to the groups syste-
maticaUy excluded. Id. at 805. The Holland Court concluded that a defendant would likewise
have standing to contest the exclusion of groups to which the defendant did not belong from
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ditional standing analysis supports the finding that a defendant has standing
to contest the exclusion of jurors of a different group on the basis of the
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement. 64 To have standing to
assert a violation of a constitutional right, the defendant first must satisfy
the article III case or controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction by
demonstrating an "injury in fact" and then show that the defendant is the
proper proponent of the protected legal right. 16 The exclusion of distinct
groups from the jury undermines the fair cross-section requirement and
distorts the common sense judgment of the jury,'6 causing the defendant
injury in fact by denying the defendant a decision reflecting the common
sense judgment of the community. 67 The defendant also is the proper
proponent of the right asserted because the right to trial by a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community is a personal right of the defendant
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.'"
In contrast to the broad basis of standing to assert a Sixth Amendment
jury discrimination claim, the Batson Court impliedly restricted standing to
assert an equal protection claim to only those defendants who are members
of the same racial group as the excluded jurors. 6 9 This position follows the
Court's prior decisions in which the Court apparently assumed without
the jury because the applicgbility of the fair cross-section requirement to the jury is a question
of the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee and not of the defendant's standing to assert
the guarantee. Id. at 806.
The Taylor Court found that a male defendant had standing to contest the exclusion of
female jurors. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975). The Taylor Court stated that
there is no rule that claims of violations of the fair cross-section requirement may be raised
only by defendants who are members of the group allegedly excluded from jury service. Id.
164. See Magid, supra note 159, at 1096-97 (stating that traditional standing analysis
demonstrates defendant's right to contest exclusion of jurors from groups to which defendant
does not belong).
165. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976) (describing two-part standing test).
The Singleton Court defined "injury in fact" as a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the
outcome of a party's suit to make the suit a case or controversy for purposes of a federal
court's Article III jurisdiction. Id.
166. See supra notes 149, 155 and accompanying text (describing effect of exclusion of
distinct groups from jury on common sense judgment of jury).
167. See Magid, supra note 159, at 1096-97 (arguing that exclusion of distinct groups of
jurors undermines fair cross-section requirement and therefore causes defendant injury in fact).
168. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113 (stating that individual has standing as matter of
course to assert violation of individual's own personal rights guaranteed by constitution);
Magid, supra note 159, at 1097 (arguing that defendant is proper proponent of violation of
personal right to trial by jury drawn from cross-section of community).
169. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that equal protection clause
forbids prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of race or on assumption
that black jurors cannot impartially consider State's case against black defendant). The
assumption of a same class rule is even clearer in the Batson Court's description of the test
by which a defendant makes a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of equal
protection principles. Id. at 96-97. Describing the first step in this test, the Court stated that
the defendant must show that the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and
that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's
race from the venire. Id. at 96.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
deciding that a defendant must be a member of the excluded class to have
standing to raise an equal protection claim. 70 The Court, however, has not
expressly decided the issue of whether a same class rule applies to defendants
seeking to assert an equal protection claim on the basis of discriminatory
jury selection procedures.' 7' Although a majority of the Supreme Court
Justices in Holland concluded in separate concurring and dissenting opinions
that a same class rule need not apply to an equal protection jury discrimi-
nation claim, 7 2 the issue was not before the Holland Court. Thus, until the
Court rules on the issue as presented 3 a defendant who seeks to assert an
170. See, e.g., Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 347 (1984) (addressing white
defendant's due process claim challenging exclusion of women and blacks from position of
grand jury foreperson and distinguishing earlier equal protection case where black defendants
were members of class allegedly excluded from position. of grand jury foreperson); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565 (1979) (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977))
(stating that to establish equal protection violation in selection of grand jury foreman defendant
must show that procedures for selecting grand jury foreman resulted in substantial underre-
presentation of defendant's race or of group to which defendant belongs); Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. at 492 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954)) (stating that
defendant is denied equal protection when all persons of defendant's race or color are excluded
from grand jury); see also W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, CROnNAL PROCEDURE § 21.2(c) (1984)
(stating that under equal protection analysis only defendant who is member of excluded class
can make constitutional challenge); Magid, supra note 159, at 1100 & nn.9, 10 (comparing
divergent lower federal court holdings concerning same class rule).
171. See Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 186 n.130 (1989) (arguing that
Supreme Court has not decided issue of same class rule and that decisions that members of
excluded class may challenge exclusion of other members of class from jury under equal
protection clause do not justify conclusion that other defendants may not challenge such
exclusion); Magid, supra note 159, at 1100 (stating that language in Supreme Court cases
suggesting same class rule is arguably dicta because language appears in cases in which
defendant is member of excluded group).
The Supreme Court may soon resolve the question of the applicability of a same class
rule to a criminal defendant seeking to contest the prosecution's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges under Batson. Powers v. Ohio, 59 U.S.L.W. 3021 (1990), directly
presented the question whether a white defendant has standing under Batson to challenge the
prosecution's removal of black prospective jurors. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 58
U.S.L.W. 3526 (1990), and has heard oral argument in the case, 59 U.S.L.W. 3307 (1990).
172. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 812 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating
that there is no reason to conclude that defendant's race should deprive defendant of standing
to vindicate jurors' right to sit.); id. at 813-14 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun,
J3., dissenting) (stating that defendant in Batson had standing to raise own rights and rights
of members of venire and of general public and that white defendant should also have such
standing); id. at 821-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that suggestion that only defendants
of same race or ethnicity as excluded jurors can enforce jurors' right to equal protection
recognized in Batson is itself inconsistent with equal protection clause); see also Alschuler,
supra note 171, at 183-95 (arguing that defendant should have standing to challenge exclusion
of jurors of different race on basis of violation of defendant's right to equal protection or on
alternate basis of third party standing to assert rights of excluded jurors). But see Magid,
supra note 159, at 1101-04 (arguing that defendant should not have third party standing to
assert rights of jurors of different race excluded from jury service).
173. See supra note 171 (noting that Supreme Court has heard oral argument on issue of
applicability of same class rule to Batson challenge in Powers v. Ohio, 59 U.S.L.W. 3021
(1990)).
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equal protection claim on the basis of discriminatory jury selection proce-
dures likely will encounter the same class rule applied by lower courts. 74
B. Different Cognizable Groups Protected by Equal Protection and Fair
Cross-Section Analyses
Different cognizable groups receive protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection and Sixth Amendment fair cross-section anal-
yses. In McCree the Supreme Court stated that in evaluating an alleged
Sixth Amendment violation a distinct or cognizable group must be defined
by reference to the purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. 7 The
McCree Court suggested that these purposes are the protection of the
defendant against arbitrary government power, the preservation of public
confidence in the criminal justice system, and the provision of an oppor-
tunity to exercise civic responsibilities. 76 Although the McCree Court dis-
174. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 917 F.2d 1286, 1288 (lth Cir. 1990) (stating
that Hispanic defendant lacked standing under Batson to contest prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude black jurors); United States v. Rodriguez-Cardenas, 866 F.2d 390, 392
(l1th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1110 (1990); United States v. Townsley, 856
F.2d 1189, 1190 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (stating that Batson is clear and straightforward in
denying standing to white defendants to challenge exclusion of black jurors), cert. dismissed,
59 U.S.L.W. 3687 (1991); United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 984 (1st Cir.) (stating that
nonblack defendants could not contest government's use of peremptory challenges to remove
black jurors under rule in Batson), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988); United States v. Vaccaro,
816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.) (stating that under Batson nonblack defendants could not make
out prima facie case of discrimination on account of government's use of peremptory challenges
to remove black jurors), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987); United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d
164, 169 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that white male had no standing to raise equal protection
violation as result of underrepresentation of females and racial minorities in position of grand
jury foreperson), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); United States v. Coletta, 682 F.2d 820,
823-24 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that defendants who failed to show exclusion of group of which
defendants were members from position of grand jury foreperson lacked standing to raise
equal protection violation), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983); State v. Massey, 247 Kan. 79,
- 795 P.2d 344, 348-49 (1990) (finding that white defendant lacked standing under Batson
to challenge prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors); Congdon v.
State, 260 Ga. 173, 175, 391 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1990) (same), vacated, 59 U.S.L.W. 9999 (1991).
But see United States v. Prine, 909 F.2d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that white
defendants had standing to challenge prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
black juror), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1318 (1991); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 607
(11th Cir.) (finding that white male defendant had standing under equal protection clause to
challenge exclusion of blacks and women from venire), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984);
United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1385-86 (lth Cir. 1982) (finding that
Hispanic man had standing to present equal protection challenge to exclusion of blacks and
women from grand jury); Bryant v. State, 565 So. 2d 1298, 1300-01 (Fla. 1990) (holding that
white defendants had standing to challenge prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude black jurors).
175. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986); see supra notes 140-43 and accom-
panying text (discussing McCree).
176. McCree, 476 U.S. at 174-75 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31
(1975)).
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cussed only groups defined by race or gender, 177 the range of cognizable
groups for purposes of the fair cross-section requirement clearly extends
beyond these limits. Thus, for purposes of a Sixth Amendment fair cross-
section claim, a cognizable group is one that is distinct from the community
in that its members share unique experiences and perspectives which other
segments of the community cannot adequately represent.1 78
Because the holding in Batson rests on equal protection principles,
179
the protected cognizable groups would be those groups which are suspect
classes in that they historically have been the object of discrimination or
politically powerless. 180 Thus, groups defined by race,'
8' national origin, 82
gender,"' alienage,184 and illegitimacy 85 have qualified as cognizable groups
requiring different levels of scrutiny for purposes of equal protection claims
and probably would qualify for protection under the Batson analysis. Groups
defined by economic or social status, arguably cognizable for Sixth Amend-
ment purposes,1 6 would not be cognizable for equal protection purposes.
177. Id. at 175.
178. See Note, supra note 14, at 1736-37 (defining cognizable group for purposes of fair
cross-section requirement as group possessing any identifiable group characteristic that gives
members distinctive experiences and perspectives within community which is inadequately
represented if group is excluded).
An early Supreme Court jury discrimination case suggests that economic, social, religious,
racial, political or geographical groups within the community should receive protection against
systematic exclusion from jury service. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
On the basis of this rationale, the Thiel Court held that daily wage earners cannot be excluded
from jury lists. Id. at 225. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 also contains its own
equivalent of the fair cross-section requirement that prohibits exclusion of jurors on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
179. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing Batson holding that equal
protection clause prohibits prosecution from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential
jurors on basis of race).
180. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)) (designating group as suspect class by considering
whether group historically has suffered purposeful unequal treatment or occupied position of
political powerlessness which commands extraordinary protection from majoritarian political
process).
181. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (stating that classificationg
based on race are constitutionally suspect and subject to rigid scrutiny).
182. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (stating that exclusion of eligible
persons from jury service because of national origin is discrimination prohibited by Fourteenth
Amendment).
183. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (stating
that classification based on gender is subject to scrutiny under equal protection clause and
that party advocating questioned classification must show that classification serves important
government objective and is substantially related to achievement of objective).
184. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294-96 (1978) (stating that classification on
basis of alien citizenship is subject to demands of equal protection clause and that state must
show rational relationship between classification and protected interest).
185. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (stating that classification based on
illegitimacy is invalid under equal protection clause if not substantially related to permissible
state interest).
186. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (describing cognizable groups for purposes
of fair cross-section analysis).
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Consequently, the range of cognizable groups that would receive protection
against discrimination under the Batson equal protection analysis would be
narrower than the range of cognizable groups for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment fair cross-section requirement.18 7
The Batson analysis, however, may afford protection against discrimi-
natory jury selection procedures to an even narrower scope of cognizable
groups than those groups that qualify for protection under the equal
protection clause. Although the Batson holding is based on equal protection
principles, the Court expressly held only that a prosecutor may not exercise
peremptory challenges against potential jurors on account of race.' The
Batson Court made no mention of extension of the rule to other groups
cognizable under equal protection principles.8 9 Disagreement among lower
federal and state courts evinces the uncertain applicability of the Batson
holding beyond the context of racial discrimination.' 90
C. Different State Action Requirements for Equal Protection and Fair
Cross-Section Analyses
The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and Sixth Amendment
fair cross-section analyses of claims of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges differ with respect to the requirement of state action. Because
the Batson holding rests on equal protection principles,' 9' the rule of Batson
187. See Comment, supra note 159, at 789 (noting that Batson test, resting on equal
protection grounds, applies only to cognizable groups that are judicially protected because of
past discrimination while fair cross-section test, resting on prohibition against discrimination.
on basis of group bias, encompasses range of groups not covered by equal protection clause).
188. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); see Alschuler, supra note 171, at 180
(stating that holding and other restrictive references to race in Batson do not resolve issue of
constitutionality of peremptory challenges based on juror's gender because issues of nonracial
exclusion were not before Court, and Court did not address such issues).
189. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123-24 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (stating
that Batson majority's holding contains limitation on basis of race and noting that holding
does not extend to other groups protected by equal protection clause).
190. Compare United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
argument that equal protection clause compels extension of Batson rule to gender-based
peremptory challenges), cert. dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1109-10 (1990) and State v. Culver, 233 Neb. 228, -, 444 N.W.2d 662, 665-66 (1989)
(holding that equal protection clause does not prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges)
and State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (stating that Batson does not extend to
gender-based discrimination) with United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding that equal protection principles prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges)
and United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (Ist Cir. 1987) (assuming but not deciding that
principles of Batson extend to ethnic as well as racial groups), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063
(1988) and State v. Levinson, 71 Haw. 492, -, 795 P.2d 845, 849-50 (1990) (holding that
gender-based peremptory challenges violate equal protection under state constitution).
191. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding that equal protection clause forbids
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of race or on assumption that black
jurors as group are unable to consider impartially state's case against black defendant).
The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause provides: "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
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offers protection against discriminatory jury selection procedures only if
such discrimination results from state action.'9 A prosecutor's discrimina-
tory exercise of peremptory challenges, as in Batson, easily satisfies the'
state action requirement because a prosecutor exercises power on behalf of
the state.1 93 The question of whether the requisite state action exists to
invoke the equal protection clause is much less certain when considering
defense counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial194 or
a private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a civil trial.195
1. Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges by Criminal Defendant
The Batson Court expressly declined to rule on the question of whether
the Constitution limits a criminal defense counsel's use of peremptory
challenges. 196 Although the Supreme Court has not subsequently addressed
this issue, commentators have argued for or against the extension of the
Batson holding to preclude a criminal defendant's discriminatory exercise
of peremptory challenges.19 Commentators advocating the extension of the
Batson holding to criminal defense counsel's use of peremptories note that
the defense acts as an officer of the court by exercising statutorily-granted
power to select jurors who are paid public employees. 98 The court then
192. See Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On
Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. R-v. 808, 811-12 (1989) (stating
that equal protection clause obviously limits only state action); see also Note, supra note 16,
at 949 (stating that federal and state constitutional rights are intended to restrain only federal
and state governmental action is axiomatic).
193. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (stating that action of
party whose official character lends weight of State to party's decisions is state action) (quoting
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)).
194. See generally Goldwasser, supra note 192, at 811-20 (discussing state action question
and concluding that defense counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges does not constitute
state action); Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v.
Kentucky, 88 COLuM. L. Ray. 355, 358-61 (1988) (arguing that defendant's use of peremptory
challenges constitutes state action); Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use of the Peremptory
Challenge after Batson v. Kentucky, 62 ST. Jon's L. REv. 46, 52-57 (1987) (same).
195. See generally Note, supra note 16, at 949-955 (discussing state action question and
concluding that civil litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action).
196. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986).
197. Compare Alschuler, supra note 171, at 197 (arguing that courts should not hesitate
to hold that criminal defendant's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes
state action) with Goldwasser, supra note 192, at 811-20 (arguing that Batson equal protection-
based limitations on prosecution's use of peremptories do not apply to defense). See also
United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that criminal
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenge is state action subject to equal protection clause);
People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 657, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 658 (holding
that judicial enforcement of defense counsel's racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
constitutes state action for purposes of state equal protection provision and that Batson applies
to defense), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
198. See Alschuler, supra note 171, at 197 (describing defense counsel's use of peremptory
challenges).
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ratifies the peremptory challenge by excusing the juror.199 Because the
defense attorney thus functions in the jury selection process by exercising
state-granted power under the auspices of the court, the defense counsel's
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action.2
Commentators arguing against a finding of state action in a criminal
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges cite constitutional state action
doctrine to distinguish a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges from
accepted forms of state action. 20' These commentators suggest that a private
party's exercise of a state-created right, the occurrence of private conduct
in a state-provided forum, or the involvement of counsel do not in them-
selves implicate state action m These commentators also argue that a court
exercises only a ministerial function in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges. 203 Because these factors fail to demonstrate the required "nexus"
between private and state conduct, a defendant's exercise of peremptory
challenges does not constitute state action.
204
Although some lower courts considering the applicability of the Batson
rule to a criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges have found
state action on the part of the defense, 205 the Supreme Court has not
addressed this issue since Batson. If the Court should decide that a defen-
dant's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges is not state action
199. See id. (noting role of court in excusing challenged jurors).
200. See id. at 197-98 (arguing that courts should hold that defendant's exercise of
peremptory challenges is subject to constitutional restraints because state should not be
permitted to delegate power to determine composition of official tribunals and then disclaim
responsibility for predictably discriminatory exercise of such authority).
201. See Goldwasser, supra note 192, at 816 (stating that accepted state action doctrine
refutes much of argument in favor of finding state action in defendant's use of peremptory
challenges).
202. See id. (arguing against finding of state action in defense's use of peremptory
challenges and citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (exercise of state-created
right); Paisey v. Vitale 807 F.2d 889, 893 (lth Cir. 1986) (private conduct in state forum);
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (involvement of counsel)).
203. See id. at 819 (noting court's ministerial role in peremptory challenges).
204. See id. at 816-20 (arguing that defense counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges
does not demonstrate necessary relationship between private defendant and government to
constitute state action and quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)). In Jackson, the Supreme Court noted the difficulty of characterizing a private party's
action as state action for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment protection. Jackson, 419 U.S.
at 349-50. The Court stated that determination of whether a private party's action constitutes
state action must turn on whether there is a "sufficiently close nexus" between the state and
the private party to attribute the party's action to the state. Id. at 351. Elaborating on this
test in a later case, the Court explained that the requirement of a close "nexus" between
private and state action ensures that the invocation of constitutional protections occurs only
when the state is sufficiently responsible for the challenged action. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982).
205. See United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenge is state action subject to equal protection
clause); People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 657, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 658
(holding that Batson applies to defense and listing cases finding state action in defense's use
of peremptory challenges), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
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for equal protection purposes, the Court's decision would narrow substan-
tially the Batson holding's scope of protection to preclude only the prose-
cution's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges.2°6 Unlike the equal
protection clause, the Sixth Amendment contains no state action require-
ment.m Instead, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a
right to trial by an impartial jury.? The impartiality of the jury is important
because the impartiality requirement protects the defendant from government
oppression.?09 The government, however, also has an interest in the impar-
tiality of the jury that tries a criminal defendant. 210 Had the Holland Court
recognized a Sixth Amendment basis for prohibiting discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges, the Court might have avoided the potentially narrow scope
of applicability of a rule based on the equal protection clause.
21'
2. Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges by Civil Litigant
The Batson Court did not address the issue of a civil litigant's discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges. 2 2 The state action requirement inher-
206. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing Batson Court's holding that
equal protection clause prohibits prosecution's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges
and Batson Court's express reservation of decision on whether defense counsel's discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges violates equal protection clause).
207. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting criminal defendant positive right to impartial
jury); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (restraining state from denying citizen equal protection
of laws).
The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend VI. The
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause provides: "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
208. See supra note 207 (quoting Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial).
209. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting function of Sixth Amendment
requirement of impartiality).
210. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 809 (1990) (noting that although Sixth
Amendment secures right to impartial jury only to individual and not to state, Sixth Amendment
expresses goal of jury impartiality with respect to both defendant and state); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (arguing for abolition of
peremptory challenges for both prosecution and defense and noting that criminal justice system
requires both freedom from bias against accused and freedom from prejudice against prose-
cution of accused).
211. But cf. Goldwasser, supra note 192, at 820 n.74 (noting possible problems of standing
for government seeking to assert equal protection violation because state has no equal protection
rights, but recognizing possibility of third party standing); Alschuler, supra note 171, at 198
(same).
The government also faces potential problems when challenging defense counsel's discrim-
inatory exercise of peremptory challenges on a Sixth Amendment basis because the Sixth
Amendment secures a right to trial by an impartial jury only to the individual defendant and
not to the State. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 809 (1990). The Holland Court, however,
recognized that the Sixth Amendment contemplates a jury that is impartial with respect to
both the defendant and the State. Id.
212. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Batson holding that equal
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ent in a Batson equal protection analysis, however, also applies when
evaluating a claim concerning a civil litigant's discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges. 2 3 When the government is a party to a civil suit,
the equal protection clause precludes the government attorney's discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges. 2 4 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has concurred in this conclusion.21" Whether the requisite state action exists
in a suit between two private litigants when one party exercises peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner is not as obvious.
One commentator has argued that a private litigant's discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for equal protection
purposes. 2 6 The argument focuses on characteristics of the peremptory
challenge process emphasized by commentators arguing for extension of the
Batson rule to a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges 2
17-
a state-licensed attorney exercises statutorily-granted power to select jurors
under the supervision of the trial judge. 2 8 Because of these features of the
peremptory challenge process in a civil trial, the argument concludes that a
private litigant's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges demon-
protection clause prohibits prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in criminal
trial).
Although the Supreme Court did not consider the constitutionality of a civil litigant's
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges in Batson, the Court may soon resolve this
issue. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 41 (1990), directly presented the question of the applicability of the Batson rule to
private counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges in a civil suit. The Supreme Court has
heard oral argument in the case. 59 U.S.L.W. 3514-15 (1991).
213. See Note, supra note 16, at 950 (stating that state action requirement is issue when
court seeks to control private litigant's use of peremptory challenges).
214. See Alschuler, supra note 171, at 184 n.123 (noting that equal protection clause
precludes discrimination by government lawyers in both civil and criminal cases).
215. See Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir.) (holding that
government counsel's actions in excluding black jurors through use of peremptory challenges
violates equal protection clause whether exclusion occurs in criminal or civil case), petition for
cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3053 (1990). In Reynolds the administratrix of a mentally disturbed
black man killed by Little Rock Police brought a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Id. at 1005. The attorney for the City used peremptory challenges to remove the two black
members of the venire. Id. When challenged by opposing counsel, the attorney for the City
refused to offer a reason for his use of peremptories on the ground that the Batson rule did
not apply to civil cases. Id. at 1008. The court noted that the crucial distinction in Batson
was not between criminal and civil cases but between government actors and private actors.
Id. Reasoning that the justifications for the rule in Batson apply equally in a civil suit against
a governmental entity and in a government prosecution of an accused, the court held that
government counsel's use of peremptory challenges to purposefully remove black jurors violates
the equal protection clause whether the exclusion occurs in a criminal or a civil case. Id. at
1008-09.
216. See Note, supra note 16, at 951-55 (arguing that private litigant's discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action).
217. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing argument that Batson
test should apply to criminal defendant's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges).
218. See Note, supra note 16, at 951-53 (noting factors favoring finding of state action
in private litigant's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges).
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strates the required "nexus" with state power to invoke equal protection
principles. 219 The lower federal and state courts which have considered this
issue, however, have reached different outcomes.?
°
The Sixth Amendment by its terms applies only to criminal cases2' and,
therefore, can offer no basis for protection against discrimination in civil
trials. The Seventh Amendment provision for jury trial in civil cases,m
however, can be interpreted to include a fair cross-section requirement like
that implicit in the Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial in criminal
cases.? Although the Seventh Amendment does not expressly provide for
219. See id. at 951 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (arguing for
finding of state action in private litigant's discriminatoiy exercise of peremptory challenges
because private exercise of peremptory challenge creates requisite "nexus" with state power);
s-upra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing "nexus" requirement).
220. Compare Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281, 1282, 1286-87
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that court's involvement in exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes
state action for equal protection purposes and that Batson forbids private litigant from
exercising race-based peremptory challenges), petition for cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3615 (1991)
and Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 828 (11th Cir.) (stating that judge's decision -to proceed
to trial with jury selected from venire on basis of race constitutes state action for purpose of
equal protection clause and that Batson applies to civil suit), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201
(1989) and Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 689-90 (N.D. Ill.) (concluding that use
of racially motivated peremptory challenges in civil cases violates equal protection clause
because plaintiff's use of federal court's powers constitutes state action), mandamus granted
and order vacated sub nom. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988) and Thomas
v. Diversified Contractors, Inc., 551 So. 2d 343, 345 (Ala. 1989) (holding that Batson jury
selection standards apply to civil as well as criminal cases but not addressing state action issue)
with Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 897 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th Cir.) (holding that Batson does not
apply to civil suit between private parties but not addressing state action issue), petition for
cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3095 (1990) and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218,
221-26 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (concluding that neither trial judge, who exercises merely ministerial
function in use of peremptory challenges, nor private counsel are state actors for equal
protection purposes and holding that Batson does not apply to civil suit), cert. granted, Ill
S. Ct. 41 (1990) and Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding
that Batson does not apply to civil case where plaintiff raises issue of defense's discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges but not addressing state action issue) and Chavous v. Brown,
S.C. , 396 S.E.2d 98, 99-100 (1990) (holding that neither trial judge's ministerial role in
peremptory challenges nor private counsel's acts constitute state action for equal protection
purposes and that Batson does not apply to civil suit).
221. See supra note 207 (quoting Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial).
222. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII (providing for jury trial in civil cases). The Seventh
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ... ." U.S. CoNs-r.
amend. VII.
223. See Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Hav. L.
REv. 1, 45 (1976) (stating that exclusion of minorities from juries violates fair cross-section
requirement inherent in Sixth and Seventh Amendments); Note, supra note 16, at 957-59
(discussing argument that Seventh Amendment prohibits discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges and arguing that logic dictates that Sixth and Seventh Amendments contemplate
right to similar types of jury trial in criminal and civil cases); supra note 115 and accompanying
text (discussing Taylor Court's description of fair cross-section requirement implied from Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision).
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:579
an "impartial" jury as the Sixth Amendment does,24 some courts have
interpreted the Seventh Amendment to require an impartial jury. More
importantly, the history underlying the adoption of the Seventh Amendment
demonstrates that the drafters of the bill of rights ultimately provided for
jury trial in civil cases for the very reason that the drafters guaranteed trial
by jury in criminal trials-to protect the individual against government
oppression . 26 The fair cross-section requirement inheres in the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury trial because it preserves the common sense judgment of
the community which protects the defendant against government oppres-
sion.227 By analogy, a fair cross-section requirement also should apply to
the civil jury because the Seventh Amendment jury trial provision reflects
similar protective concerns.m
The discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges in either the crim-
inal or the civil context undermines the common sense judgment of the jury
and the jury's role in the protection of the individual."2 9 If the Holland
Court had recognized this fact and precluded the discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges as a violation of the Sixth Amendment fair cross-
section requirement,230 then an analogous prohibition on the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial would derive from the Seventh
Amendment.23' Because the Seventh Amendment has no state action require-
224. See supra note 222 (quoting Seventh Amendment provision for jury trial); supra note
207 (quoting Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial).
225. See Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965) (implying requirement
of impartiality in Seventh Amendment provision for jury trial in civil case on basis of Fifth
Amendment due process clause).
226. See Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REv. 639, 670-71 (1973) (noting that proponents of civil jury trial advocated provision for
civil jury to protect debtor defendants, to frustrate unwise legislation, to overturn practices of
courts of vice-admiralty, to vindicate interests of private citizens in litigation with government,
and to protect litigants against oppressive judges).
227. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing Taylor Court's description
of function of cross-section requirement in preservation of common sense judgment of jury
and protection of individual against government oppression).
228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (describing historical concerns for pro-
tection of individual underlying Seventh Amendment provision for jury trial).
229. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (arguing that Holland Court wrongly
concluded that exclusion of groups from jury through discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges does not undermine common sense judgment and protective purpose of jury).
230. See supra notes 39, 158 and accompanying text (describing Holland Court's holding
that Sixth Amendment provides no basis for prohibition of discriminatory exercise of peremp-
tory challenges); supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (arguing that discriminatory exercise
of peremptory challenges undermines central protective function of Sixth Amendment provision
for jury trial and, consequently, that discriminatory peremptories should be prohibited as
violation of Sixth Amendment).
231. See supra notes 223-28 and accompanying text (arguing by analogy to Sixth Amend-
ment that Seventh Amendment provision for jury trial includes fair cross-section requirement).
A Seventh Amendment fair cross-section requirement would provide a basis for protection
against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in civil cases. Such protection, however,
would apply only in federal courts because the Supreme Court has yet to apply the Seventh
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ment, 32 a Seventh Amendment-based prohibition of discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges would avoid the difficult question of whether a private
litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action inherent
in an equal protection analysis.23 Because the Holland Court found no
Sixth Amendment basis for precluding discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges,2 4 however, any argument against such challenges in a civil trial
based on a Seventh Amendment fair cross-section requirement would fail.
Consequently, if the Court eventually finds that a private litigant's discrim-
inatory exercise of peremptory challenges does not constitute state action
for equal protection purposes,235 the rule of Batson effectively will be limited
to application only in criminal cases. 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. KentuckyA 7 represented a
significant advance in the protection of a criminal defendant against dis-
criminatory jury selection procedures.2 8 The Batson holding extended to
the jury the protection against discriminatory jury selection procedures that
earlier cases applied to the venire2 while enabling a defendant to prove
such discrimination by reference to the prosecutor's acts in the defendant's
case alone.m The Batson Court, however, specifically refused to address
both the defendant's Sixth Amendment claims24 and the question of whether
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp.,
591 F.2d 1164, 1171 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440,
1451 n.16 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that Seventh Amendment does not apply to state court
proceedings).
232. See supra note 222 (quoting Seventh Amendment provision for jury trial).
233. See supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text (discussing whether civil litigant's
exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for equal protection purposes).
234. See supra notes 39, 158 and accompanying text (describing Holland Court's holding
that Sixth Amendment provides no basis for prohibition of discriminatory exercise of peremp-
tory challenges).
235. See supra note 212 (noting that Supreme Court has heard oral argument on case
presenting question of applicability of Batson to civil trial, which necessarily entails analysis
of state action issue for private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenge).
236. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221-26 (5th Cir.) (en banc)
(concluding that neither trial judge nor private counsel are state actors for equal protection
purposes and holding that Batson does not apply to discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges in civil suit), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990); Chavous v. Brown, S.C.
396 S.E.2d 98, 99-100 (1990) (same).
237. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
238. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text (discussing Batson).
239. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (discussing Batson Court's reasoning
that equal protection clause prohibits prosecution's racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges as well as discrimination in composition of venire).
240. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing Batson test for proving
prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by relying only on prosecutor's
acts at defendant's trial).
241. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Batson Court's decision to
consider defendant's claims under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles instead
of Sixth Amendment fair cross-section principles).
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the prohibition on discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges extended
to the defense. 242 Confronted with an opportunity to address the Sixth
Amendment issue in Holland v. Illinois,24 the Supreme Court refused to
find a Sixth Amendment basis for prohibiting discriminatory peremptory
challenges.'-" Focusing on the Sixth Amendment provision for an impartial
jury, the Holland Court concluded that jury impartiality is the central
purpose of the Sixth Amendment provision for jury trial2-" and that per-
emptory challenges, which serve to ensure jury impartiality, should remain
unencumbered by Sixth Amendment-based restrictions. 24" The Holland de-
cision thus relegated analysis of claims of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges to the Batson test.' 7 Because the Batson analysis rests on equal
protection principles,-" the Batson analysis necessitates inquiries concerning
a party's standing to assert a claim of discrimination,-M the membership of
excluded jurors in certain suspect classes,25° and the question of whether
the exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action.2 ' All such
inquiries, however, are inapplicable to a fair cross-section analysis derived
from the Sixth or Seventh Amendment provisions for jury trial.252 Because
lower courts generally have interpreted the Batson holding quite strictly,253
242. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Batson Court's refusal to
consider whether defense counsel's discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges would
violate equal protection clause).
243. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
244. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's holding that
Sixth Amendment provides no basis to prohibit prosecutor's discriminatory exercise of per-
emptory challenges).
245. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's conclusion
that jury impartiality is central purpose of Sixth Amendment jury trial provision).
246. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's reasoning
that recognition of Sixth Amendment-based prohibition on discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges would undermine role of challenge in securing jury impartiality but stating that
discriminatory use of challenges is illegal under Batson).
247. See supra notes 40, 158 and accompanying text (discussing Holland Court's default
to Batson analysis of claims of discriminatory peremptory challenges).
248. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Batson Court's holding that
equal protection clause precludes prosecution's racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges).
249. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (discussing issue of standing to assert
claim of discriminatory peremptory challenges under Batson equal protection analysis).
250. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text (discussing cognizable groups under
Batson equal protection analysis).
251. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing state action issue for
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges); supra notes 213-20 and accompanying
text (discussing state action issue for civil litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges).
252. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text (discussing standing issue for fair
cross-section claim); supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discussing cognizable groups
for purposes of fair cross-section claim); supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing
lack of state action issue for fair cross-section claim).
253. See supra note 174 (listing lower court cases applying "same-class" standing rule to
Batson equal protection claims); supra note 190 (listing lower court cases refusing to extend
Batson beyond context of racial discrimination); supra note 220 (listing lower court cases
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the Holland Court's decision to default to the Batson analysis narrows the
scope of protection against discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges.
JEMERSON EDWARD HowETH
refusing to apply Batson to context of civil suit because civil litigant's exercise of peremptory
challenges does not constitute state action for equal protection purposes).
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Addendum
On April 1, 1991, the United States Supreme Court followed the lead
of the five concurring and dissenting Justices in Holland and held that a
criminal defendant has standing to object to the prosecution's use of race-
based peremptory challenges to exclude jurors regardless of whether the
defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race. Powers v. Ohio, 59
U.S.L.W. 4268, 4269 (1991). In Powers, a white defendant raised a Batson
objection to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to remove seven
black prospective jurors. Id. Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice
Kennedy first reviewed prior discriminatory jury selection cases and held
that the equal protection clause prohibits the prosecution from using per-
emptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely because of race. Id.
at 4269-71. The Powers Court then considered whether a criminal defendant
has standing to assert the equal protection rights of excluded jurors. Id. at
4271. The Powers Court noted that the propriety of a litigant's assertion
of third-party standing depends upon the litigant having suffered an "injury-
in-fact," the existence of a close relation between the litigant and the third
party, and the existence of some hindrance to the third party's assertion of
personal rights. Id. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges undermines the integrity and appearance of fairness
of the trial process and causes the defendant injury in fact. Id. at 4271-72.
Justice Kennedy further noted that the defendant and jurors establish a
close relation during voir dire that continues throughout the trial. Id. at
4272. Finally, Justice Kennedy noted that substantial procedural and eco-
nomic barriers prevent excluded jurors from bringing suit on their own
behalf. Id. Consequently, the Powers Court held that a criminal defendant
can assert third-party equal protection rights of jurors excluded by the
prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id.
On June 3, 1991, the United States Supreme Court extended the Batson
rule to the context of a civil trial and held that a private litigant's use of
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race
violates the jurors' equal protection rights. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 59 U.S.L.W. 4574, 4575 (1991). In Edmonson, a black plaintiff sought
to raise a Batson challenge to the defendant's use of two of three peremptory
challenges to exclude black jurors from the jury impaneled to hear his
negligence claim. Id. Writing for the six-member majority, Justice Kennedy
first noted that racial discrimination is harmful in the context of either civil
or criminal proceedings. Id. The Edmonson Court then addressed the
question of whether a private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges
constitutes state action that implicates constitutional protections. Id.
Relying on the state action test enunciated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the Edmonson Court asked whether the asserted
constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right derived from
state authority and whether the private party responsible for causing the
deprivation fairly could be characterized as a state actor. Id. at 4576. The
Court easily concluded that the defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
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lenges satisfied the first part of the Lugar test because the defendant
exercised the peremptory challenges pursuant to a federal statute. Id. The
Court also found that a private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenges
is state action implicating constitutional protections. Id. The Edmonson
Court noted that a private litigant relies on the substantial participation of
the court in the exercise of peremptory challenges, that the selection of a
jury through the use of peremptory challenges in a civil trial constitutes the
private performance of a traditional government function, and that the
incidents of government authority evident in the courtroom aggravate the
injury caused by discriminatory peremptory challenges. Id. at 4576-78.
Consequently, the Edmonson Court held that a private litigant's racially
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action that
violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors. Id. at 4575-76

